Abstract

We study the influence of risk diversification on cascading failures in weighted complex networks, where weighted directed links represent exposures between nodes. These weights result from different diversification strategies and their adjustment allows us to reduce systemic risk significantly by topological means. As an example, we contrast a classical exposure diversification (ED) approach with a damage diversification (DD) variant. The latter reduces the loss that the failure of high degree nodes generally inflict to their network neighbors and thus hampers the cascade amplification. To quantify the final cascade size and obtain our results, we develop a branching process approximation taking into account that inflicted losses cannot only depend on properties of the exposed, but also of the failing node. This analytic extension is a natural consequence of the paradigm shift from individual to system safety. To deepen our understanding of the cascade process, we complement this systemic perspective by a mesoscopic one: an analysis of the failure risk of nodes dependent on their degree. Additionally, we ask for the role of these failures in the cascade amplification.

Abstract

We study cascades on a two-layer multiplex network, with asymmetric feedback that depends on the coupling strength between the layers. Based on an analytical branching process approximation, we calculate the systemic risk measured by the final fraction of failed nodes on a reference layer. The results are compared with the case of a single layer network that is an aggregated representation of the two layers. We find that systemic risk in the two-layer network is smaller than in the aggregated one only if the coupling strength between the two layers is small. Above a critical coupling strength, systemic risk is increased because of the mutual amplification of cascades in the two layers. We even observe sharp phase transitions in the cascade size that are less pronounced on the aggregated layer. Our insights can be applied to a scenario where firms decide whether they want to split their business into a less risky core business and a more risky subsidiary business. In most cases, this may lead to a drastic increase of systemic risk, which is underestimated in an aggregated approach.

Abstract

We present a framework to calculate the cascade size evolution for a large class of cascade models on random network ensembles in the limit of infinite network size. Our method is exact and applies to network ensembles with almost arbitrary degree distribution, degree-degree correlations and, in case of threshold models, for arbitrary threshold distribution. With our approach, we shift the perspective from the known branching process approximations to the iterative update of suitable probability distributions. Such distributions are key to capture cascade dynamics that involve possibly continuous quantities and that depend on the cascade history, e.g. if load is accumulated over time. As a proof of concept, we provide two examples: (a) Constant load models that cover many of the analytically tractable casacade models, and, as a highlight, (b) a fiber bundle model that was not tractable by branching process approximations before. Our derivations cover the whole cascade dynamics, not only their steady state. This allows to include interventions in time or further model complexity in the analysis.